Panel Discussion on Religious Freedom for Social Harmony, Stability, and Global Peace

June 19, 2025: 108 Peace Institute, in collaboration with Raden Wijaya State Buddhist College, successfully hosted a virtual panel discussion on June 19, 2025, titled “Religious Freedom for Social Harmony, Stability, and Global Peace.”

The panel brought together diverse voices and expertise on religious freedom, fostering rich and insightful dialogue for the audience. The discussion featured Ms. Tenzin Nordin, a Harvard Law graduate, and Mr. Rehmad Setyoko, a PhD candidate and lecturer at Raden Wijaya State Buddhist College.

The first panelist, Ms. Tenzin shared her insights on religious freedom within the context of international human rights law, focusing on three key instruments:

  1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948)
  2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966)
  3. General Comment No. 22 (1993) – specifically interpreting Article 18 of the ICCPR

She explained that the UDHR is a foundational post–World War II document that affirms basic human rights for all people simply by virtue of being human. From its 30 enumerated rights, she highlighted Article 18, which states:

“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom […] either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”

While the UDHR sets globally agreed standards, Ms. Tenzin noted it is not legally binding. The ICCPR was established to translate UDHR principles into a binding treaty that states can ratify and be held accountable to. The ICCPR obliges signatory countries to protect rights such as life, freedom of speech, and religious freedom, and to provide remedies for violations.

She elaborated on Article 18 of the ICCPR, which declares:

  1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right shall include the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching
  2. No one shall be subject to coercion, which would impair their freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of their choice.
  3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedom of others.
  4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents, and when applicable, legal guardians, to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

She also emphasized General Comment No. 22 (1993), which clarifies that the practice of religion includes acts essential to the religion, such as choosing religious leaders and teachers. General Comments serve as interpretive guidance on how ICCPR provisions should be implemented in real life.

Critique of China’s Order No. 5

Building on these legal standards, Ms. Tenzin examined China’s Order No. 5, titled “Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism”. She explained how the order constrains the freedom of Tibetan Buddhist communities to determine their religious leadership and practices, particularly regarding reincarnation—a deeply spiritual tradition.

Although Article 1 of the order claims to respect religious beliefs and Tibetan Buddhist customs, Ms. Tenzin argued that it directly contradicts General Comment No. 22, as it infringes on the community’s autonomy to choose religious leaders.

According to Article 5 of the order, a complex state-controlled registration and approval process is required for recognizing reincarnated leaders, involving multiple layers of government and culminating in possible approval by the State Council for high-impact religious figures such as the Dalai Lama. This structure effectively transfers religious authority to the state.

Misuse of Limitations Under ICCPR Article 18

Reflecting on ICCPR Article 18(3), which allows certain legal limitations on religious freedom, Ms. Tenzin pointed out that such restrictions must be lawful and necessary for public safety or protection of others’ rights. She questioned whether Order No. 5 meets this threshold.

While the Chinese government may frame its regulation as a response to potential political unrest due to Tibet’s history of resistance, the panelist argues that there is no clear evidence that reincarnation practices—particularly those involving the Dalai Lama—pose any actual threat to public order.

She noted that the Dalai Lama renounced political power in 2011, transferring authority to an elected leader, and now serves solely as a spiritual figure. Thus, reincarnation remains a religious, not political, matter. She emphasized that the reincarnation system in Tibetan Buddhism does not inherently disrupt public order or pose a threat to safety. Politicizing this spiritual tradition does not justify altering it.

She further argued that the reincarnation tradition does not infringe on others’ rights, nor does it affect public health or morality. Therefore, Order No. 5 lacks legal justification under international human rights law.

Looking at the broader implications of Tibetan Buddhism, Ms. Tenzin warned that China’s Order No. 5 undermines Article 18 of the UDHR, using limitations on religious freedom as a pretext for political control. The state’s interference threatens the essence of Tibetan Buddhism by manipulating its leadership succession process and distorting its philosophy.

She drew attention to the Panchen Lama case, where a state-appointed religious figure was used to sideline the one chosen by the Dalai Lama. She expressed concern that this could trigger a “domino effect,” resulting in state-sanctioned religious leaders across the Buddhist hierarchy, undermining their spiritual legitimacy.

She warned that this mandatory approval mechanism dangerously places the state in control of reincarnation—a fundamentally spiritual phenomenon beyond its scope. She shared that such policies also amount to the Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism—converting it to align with state ideologies—and threaten not only religious freedom but also Tibetan cultural and spiritual identity.

In her final reflections, Ms. Tenzin asserted that true harmony arises from respecting diversity, not enforcing uniformity. When states suppress religious communities, they breed resentment and instability. Since religious practice is inherently tied to individual and collective identity, China’s interference in Tibetan Buddhism is also an attack on Tibetan identity, culture, and spirituality, said the panelist. She stressed that Order No. 5 directly conflicts with international human rights obligations and the Chinese government’s stated goal of protecting Tibetan Buddhism.

The second panelist, Mr. Rehmad Setyoko, presented his insights on the topic from the perspective of regulating harmony within Indonesian society. He highlighted that despite Indonesia’s religious and cultural diversity, the government has successfully maintained religious harmony. For example, the Ministry of Religious Affairs actively participates in Buddhist Vesak ceremonies, demonstrating a commitment to interfaith engagement.

Mr. Rehmad explored the tension between excessive tolerance and active pluralism, noting that while participation in ceremonies of different faiths is a gesture of harmony, it also invites debate within modern society. He emphasized that Indonesia’s form of Islam promotes harmony and tolerance, and in a dynamic society, government policy must also embody harmony.

He walked the audience through the historical evolution of presidential approaches to faith and pluralism in Indonesia. He noted that earlier administrations varied in their stance—ranging from pluralist and politicized to controlled and restrictive—but consistently aimed to preserve religious harmony. Since Indonesia’s independence in 1945, successive governments have attempted to uphold interfaith coexistence.

According to Mr. Rehmad, religious moderation became a national objective under President Joko Widodo, who integrated it into various sectors, including religious education. Today, religious harmony remains a national priority.

To support this goal, several legal measures were introduced to guarantee freedom of religion, providing a strong legal foundation. The government officially recognizes six religions, a framework initially introduced to prevent blasphemy. While regulations guarantee students’ right to receive religious education, a shortage of qualified religious teachers sometimes results in students learning about a different religion.

From 2020 to 2024, Indonesia actively promoted religious moderation to reinforce a pluralist narrative. However, Mr. Rehmad acknowledged that religious moderation is still in a normative rather than fully practical stage.

In his concluding remarks, Mr. Rehmad emphasized that since Indonesia is not a religious state, in a modern democratic society, neither the state nor religion should dominate the other. Instead, there should be mutual regulation: the state must treat all religious communities equally and impartially, while religious groups should uphold democratic principles, avoid coercion, and respect the rights of others. This balanced approach to regulating religious freedom is not intended to repress, but rather to promote justice, fairness, and peaceful coexistence.

The panel discussion became increasingly insightful as the moderator and audience posed deeply reflective questions.
In response to a question about promoting religious freedom in a multicultural society, both speakers emphasized the importance of interfaith dialogue. Mr. Rehmad highlighted the need for grassroots-level engagement at the local level rather than limiting efforts to formal settings. Ms. Nordin added that legal protection for religious institutions—which serve as avenues for individuals to exercise their freedom of religion—is essential for promoting religious freedom in culturally diverse societies.

When asked whether the absence of any religious belief falls under the scope of religious freedom, Ms. Nordin clarified that Article 18 of both the UDHR and the ICCPR protects not only the freedom to practice a religion, but also the freedom not to follow any religion.

However, Mr. Rehmad pointed out that in Indonesia, individuals are expected to choose one of the six officially recognized religions as part of their identity. As a result, followers of indigenous religions have often had to convert to one of these six to align with the government’s efforts to promote religious harmony. He explained that in Indonesia, atheism is not legally recognized, as the government finds it necessary to categorize citizens based on their religious affiliation for administrative purposes.

Mr. Rehmad further noted that this has led to an unequal status between imported religions—referring to the six officially recognized religions—and indigenous religions, which often remain marginalized under the current system.

The panel discussion, attended by around 60 participants, concluded with a strong and clear message: freedom of religion is not a privilege—it is a fundamental human right. The government must protect this right, not to politicize it by imposing regulations on religious matters, interfering in the recognition of spiritual leaders, or undermining the authenticity of any religion’s teachings.

 

partnership requests

Career and internship

General Inquiries

Tsering Youdon

Program Manager

Tsering Youdon is the Program Manager at 108 Peace Institute. She has 6 years of experience as a project officer and program coordinator in the Central Tibetan Administration’s Nepal branch. Her expertise includes planning, designing, and monitoring projects and supporting the capacity building of local organizations and individuals. Tsering is an MBA graduate from Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) in New York.

Tenzin Donzey

Program Manager

Tenzin Donzey is a Program Manager at the 108 Peace Institute. She has served in the Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR), Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) as a Project Officer and Tibet Support Groups’ Liaison Officer. Tenzin has extensive experience in planning, designing, and managing programs. She is a recipient of the Tibetan Scholarship Program under which she obtained an MBA from Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT), New York.

Dr Lobsang Sangay

Founder and President

Lobsang Sangay is a Senior Visiting Fellow at East Asian Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School. He was a democratically elected Sikyong (President) of the Central Tibetan Administration and served two terms (2011-21). Lobsang completed his BA and LLB from Delhi University. He did his LLM ’95 and SJD ‘04 from Harvard Law School and received the Yong K. Kim’ 95 Memorial Prize for excellence in dissertation and contributions to the understanding of East Asia at the Harvard Law School. While at Harvard, akin to track III, he organized seven rounds of meetings/conferences between Tibetan, Western, and Chinese scholars, most notably, the first-ever meeting between HH the Dalai Lama and Chinese scholars and students.

སྤྱིར་བཏང་གི་འདྲི་རྩད།

ལས་ཀ་དང་ཉམས་གསོག

མཉམ་ལས་ཀྱི་རེ་འདུན།

Lobsang Dakpa

Operations Director

Lobsang Dakpa currently serves as the Operations Director of the 108 Peace Institute. He was a democratically elected Member of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile from 2016 to 2021. Lobsang holds a BA and LLB, having studied at the National Law School of India University in Bengaluru and JSS Law College in Mysuru. He also earned his LLM from Christ University, Bengaluru. From 2015 to 2016, he worked as a senior Chinese-language reporter for Voice of Tibet. He is a founding member of the Tibetan Legal Association (TLA), where he served as General Secretary from 2013 to 2016 and was later elected as President, serving from 2016 to 2022. Throughout his career, Lobsang has provided legal awareness and education to thousands of Tibetans and non-Tibetans across settlements, monasteries, and schools. He has also offered free legal assistance to many individuals in need. During his term in Parliament, he was invited to participate in numerous national and international conferences, representing the Tibetan community and advocating for justice and human rights.

洛桑扎巴

运营总管

洛桑扎巴目前担任108和平研究院的运营总监。他曾于2016年至2021年间,作为民选代表在西藏人民议会任职。 洛桑拥有文学学士(BA)和法学学士(LLB)学位,曾就读于印度班加罗尔国家法学院(National Law School of India University)和迈索尔JSS法学院(JSS Law College)。他还在班加罗尔基督大学(Christ University)获得了法学硕士(LLM)学位。 2015年至2016年期间,他曾担任“西藏之声”电台的资深中文记者。他是西藏法律协会(Tibetan Legal Association, TLA)的创始成员之一,并于2013年至2016年担任该协会的秘书长,随后于2016年至2022年担任会长。 在其职业生涯中,洛桑致力于为西藏定居点、寺院和学校的成千上万名藏人及非藏人提供法律知识普及和教育。他还为许多有需要的人士免费提供法律援助。 在其议员任期内,他受邀参加了众多国内外会议,代表藏人社区发声,积极倡导正义与人权。

བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ།

ལག་བསྟར་སྤྱི་ཁྱབ་འགན་འཛིན།

བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ་ནི་༡༠༨ཞི་བདེ་ལྟེ་གནས་ཀྱི་ལག་བསྟར་འགན་འཛིན་ཡིན།ཕྱི་ལོ་༢༠༡༦ནས་༢༠༢༡དབར་ཁོང་གིས་བོད་མི་མང་སྤྱི་འཐུས་ཀྱི་ཕྱག་ལས་གནང་།ཁྲིམས་ལུགས་མཐོ་སློབ་ National Law school of India University, Bangalore དང་Mysore JSS Law School བརྒྱུདཁོང་ཉིད་་ཁྲིམས་ལུགས་རབ་འབྱམས་པ་ (LL.B) སློབ་མཐར་སོན། ཕྱི་ལོ་ ༢༠༡༤ ལོར་རྒྱ་གར་ཁྲིམས་ལུགས་མཐོ་སློབ་Christ Law School, Bangalore ནས་ཁྲིམས་ལུགས་གཙུག་ལག་རབ་འབྱམས་པ (LL.M) མཐར་ཕྱིན་པ་གནང་པ་མ་ཟད།ཁོང་ནི་བོད་མིའི་ཁྲིམས་ལུགས་རིག་པ་བའི་ཚོགས་པ་གསར་འཛུགས་གནང་མཁན་ཁོངས་ཀྱི་མི་སྣ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པ་དང་།ཕྱི་ལོ་༢༠༡༣ནས་༢༠༡༦བར་ཚོགས་པ་དེའི་སྤྱི་ཁྱབ་དྲུང་ཆེའི་ཕྱག་ལས་གནང་པ་དང་།ཕྱི་ལོ་༢༠༡༥ནས་༢༠༡༦དབར་ལོ་གཅིག་རིང་ནོར་ཝེ་བོད་ཀྱི་རླུང་འཕྲིན་ཁང་གི་རྒྱ་སྐད་གསར་འགོད་པ་རྒན་པའི་ཕྱག་ལས་གནང་ཡོད།ཕྱི་ལོ་༢༠༡༦ནས་༢༠༢༢དབར་བོད་མིའི་ཁྲིམས་ལུགས་རིག་པ་བའི་ཚོགས་པའི་ཚོགས་གཙོའི་ཕྱག་ལས་གནང་པ་རེད།དུས་ཡུན་དེ་དག་གི་རིང་།ཁོང་གིས་བཙན་བྱོལ་བོད་མིའི་དགོན་སྡེ་ཁག་དང་སློབ་གྲྭ་ཁག།གཞིས་ཆགས་ཁག་ཏུ་བསྐྱོད་ནས་བོད་མི་ཁྲི་སྟོང་མང་པོ་ལ་ཁྲིམས་ལུགས་ཀྱི་གོ་རྟོགས་སྤེལ་པ་མ་ཚད།ཁྲིམས་དོན་གྱི་དཀའ་ངལ་འཕྲད་པའི་བོད་མི་རྒྱ་ཕྲག་མང་པོ་ལ་ཕྱག་རོགས་གནང་ཡོད།ཁོང་གིས་བོད་མི་མང་སྤྱི་འཐུས་ཀྱི་ཕྱག་ལས་གནང་ཡུན་རིང་།རྒྱལ་ནང་དང་རྒྱལ་སྤྱིའི་ཚོགས་སྡེ་འདྲ་མིན་ཀྱིས་གདན་ཞུས་གནང་ཏེ་བརྗོད་གཞི་འདྲ་མིན་ཐོག་ཚོགས་འདུ་ཆེ་ཆུང་མང་པོ་ལ་ཆ་ཤས་གནང་ཡོད་པ་རེད།